Pirates (Repost)

Many games, books and movies have themes of good guys versus bad guys. Pirates were the bad guys. Why then are they often romanticized? Why did Disney build a ride, and an E ticket one at that, honoring villainous pirates? Could someone really be a "good man and a pirate" as Captain Jack Sparrow suggests in "Pirates of the Caribbean"?

Peter Leeson, an economist at George Mason University, has written extensively about 18 century pirates. In an article entitled, "In Defense of Pirates (The Old Time Ones)," (NPR, April 10, 2009) he reminds us why pirates are bad but continue to hold our interest.

All pirates are thugs, and the world would be better off without them. But not all pirates are equal. Unlike their Somali successors, early 18th century pirates, men like Blackbeard, "Black Bart" Roberts, and "Calico" Jack Rackam, weren't only thieves. They were also early experimenters with some of the modern world's most cherished values, such as liberty, democracy, and equality.

The 16th and 17th centuries saw an increase in exploration, colonization and trade. Merchants did not man their ships; they hired a captain and a crew. This organization created a principle-agent problem. The captain and crew did not have incentives to care for the ship nor its cargo. Merchants overcame this problem by selling or granting a captain shares in the ship. Unfortunately for the crew, the captain then had incentives to impose harsh discipline, docked wages, and cut food rations. It increased his profit.

Seaman came from the lowest socioeconomic elements of society, and were often abused by merchant captains. Piracy was an alternative career choice that gave some protection from predation and a chance at wealth. Pirates owned their ships and operated them as a floating stock company. They behaved democratically as shared owners.

Pirates still needed captains to find prey and make decisions in battle. Experience made them wary of predation by their captains, and they limited it using several techniques common in today's governments. The first was to democratically elect captains. Leeson observes ("An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organizations, Journal of Political, vol. 115, no. 6, 2007),

...pirates could and did democratically elect their captains without problem. Since the pirates sailing a particular ship were both the principals and the agents, democracy did not threaten to lead to captains who served the agents at the principals’ expense. On the contrary, pirate democracy ensured that pirates got precisely the kind of captain they desired. Because pirates could popularly depose any captain who did not suit them and elect another in his place, pirate captains’ ability to prey on crew members was greatly constrained compared to that of merchant ship captains.

Pirates further limited the captains power through divided authority, much as we do with separation of powers in a modern democracy.

The primary “other officer” pirates “constituted” for this purpose was the quartermaster. The way this office worked is straightforward. Captains retained absolute authority in times of battle, enabling pirates to realize the benefits of autocratic control required for success in conflict. However, pirate crews transferred power to allocate provisions, select and distribute loot (there was rarely room aboard pirate ships to take all they seized from a prize), and adjudicate crew member conflicts/administer discipline to the quartermaster, whom they democratically elected...

To limit abuse by the quartermaster, pirates instituted articles of agreement or constitutions defining the rights and punishments of crews.

Articles of agreement required unanimous consent. Consequently, pirates democratically formed them in advance of launching pirating expeditions. “All [pirates] swore to ’em,” sometimes on a Bible or, for one pirate crew, “upon a Hatchet for want of a Bible.” The crew forged its articles alongside the election of a captain, quartermaster, and occasionally other smaller officers. Pirates sought agreement on their articles (ex ante “to prevent Disputes and Ranglings afterwards” (Johnson 1726–28, 342). In the event a pirate disagreed with their conditions, he was free to search elsewhere for more satisfactory terms.

Finally, pirate crews were often more racially tolerant than government operating contemporaneously.

Some historical pirates even embraced racial tolerance before their legitimate counterparts. England didn't abolish slavery until 1772. In the United States slavery persisted until 1865, and blacks didn't enjoy equal rights as citizens, politically or in the workplace, until even later than this. Some historical pirates, however, extended suffrage to their black crewmembers and subscribed to the practice of "equal pay for equal work," or rather, "equal pay for equal prey," in the early 1700s.

Democratic social innovations by pirates does not make them good guys, but it does make them interesting. Leeson has interested me enough in pirates that I am placing his book, "The Invisible Hook," on my summer reading list.